Abstract-Cutting a cake is a metaphor for the problem of dividing a resource (cake) among several agents. The problem becomes non-trivial when the agents have different valuations for different parts of the cake (i.e., one agent may like chocolate, while the other may like cream). A fair division of the cake is one that takes into account the individual valuations of agents and partitions of the cake based on some fairness criterion. Fair division may be accomplished in a distributed or centralized way. Due to its natural and practical appeal, it has been a subject of study in economics. To the best of our knowledge, the role of partial information in fair division has not been studied so far from an information theoretic perspective. Given the diversity of problems in fair division, we consider certain specific (yet important) problems that capture different aspects of information exchange in a fair division setting. From the class of distributed algorithms, we consider the classical divide and choose (DC) problem between two parties. Here, we study the effect of partial spying and voluntarily sharing of information in both one-shot and asymptotic scenarios. Furthermore, we consider implicit information transmission through actions for the repeated version of the problem. While identifying subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in repeated games with incomplete information on both sides is very difficult in general, for the special case of division of two items, we find a more stringent trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Next, from the class of centralized algorithms, we consider the Adjusted Winner (AW) algorithm between two players Alice and Bob. Brams and Taylor showed that if Alice can fully spy on Bob, she can trick the algorithm. We consider the same setup when partial spying is allowed and study the growth rate of Alice's utility per spying bit. Via a transformation from AW to DC, it is shown that the problem reduces to the one studied earlier for DC. However, if Alice is forced to only spy certain simple structured functions of Bob's valuation, an upper bound on the growth rate of utility per spying bit is derived. This bound is shown to be tight in some cases. We also consider a centralized algorithm for maximizing the overall welfare of the agents under the Nash collective utility function (CUF). This corresponds to a clustering problem. By observing a link between this problem and the portfolio selection problem in stock markets, we provide an upper bound on the increase of the Nash CUF for a clustering refinement.
Information Theoretic Cutting of a Cake I. INTRODUCTION I N MANY applications a number of parties are interested in possessing a limited resource, e.g. a set of goods or metaphorically a cake. 1 Each of the parties has his own valuation of different parts of the cake, and each has full, partial or no information about the valuation of the other parties. Finding a way to divide a cake fairly has attracted the attention of economists and mathematicians for a long time. Although information theory is developed for studying communication systems [4] , it gives us tools to quantify information in other fields (such as fair-division) where partial information is of relevance. For instance consider a division game between Alice and Bob where Bob is unwilling to let Alice spy on his information (as that information can be advantageous for Alice, since it would reduce her uncertainty about Bob's actions). One of the results of this paper is to show that there are cases where if Bob learns that the spying rate of Alice exceeds a certain threshold, he will become willing to voluntarily share even more information with Alice. Thus, identifying when this happens can be of importance to Alice and Bob in designing the rules of the game.
A. Fair Division
In this paper we assume that the reader is familiar with network information theory but not necessarily with fair division. Before trying to find a fair division, one must define the term "fairness". Several criteria of fairness have been introduced to judge the goodness of a division where none of which subsumes the others [5] . Here we will give a brief introduction to four of them. Assume that k denotes the number of parties.
• A division is said to be proportional if each party receives at least 1/k of the entire cake w.r.t. his own valuation.
• A division is said to be equitable if the piece of the cake each party obtains w.r.t. his own valuation is exactly equal to what the other parties receive (w.r.t. their own valuation).
• A division is said to be envy-free if no party believes that, w.r.t. his own valuation, the piece another party has received is more valuable than his own.
• A division is said to be efficient or Pareto optimal if it is not possible to find another division that increases the utility of every individual. In the literature of fair division, there are two major assumptions regarding the set of goods to be divided: the category of divisible goods where each good or item could be divided among parties, and the category of indivisible goods where each item should wholly be given to one party (e.g. a car or a laptop) [6] . Analyzing division of divisible goods is generally easier than that of indivisible goods. In the most generic scenario some of the items may be divisible, some indivisible and some partially divisible. We take care of this generic scenario by considering a set D of "admissible" divisions of the resource. Theoretically the set D is of size infinity if we have a divisible item in the resource (since we can cut that item in any proportion). Practically speaking, even divisible items can be cut up to a certain precision. Therefore for simplicity we assume that the set D is finite (unless stated otherwise). Lastly, the preferences or valuations of parties could be ordinal or cardinal. Here we assume that valuations are cardinal, i.e. can be modeled by non-negative real numbers.
Any algorithm providing a fair division may satisfy one or some of the fairness conditions introduced above (see for instance [7] , [8] for conflicts in fairness criteria and tradeoffs). From another point of view, fair division may be accomplished in a distributed or centralized way. In a distributed algorithm the individuals should divide the cake amongst themselves, while in a centralized one, an external referee divides the cake for them. In order to address these two categories, we have chosen two prominent algorithms from the field, Divideand-Choose (DC) from the category of distributed algorithms and Adjusted Winner (AW) from the category of centralized algorithms. In our discussion of centralized algorithms, we also consider the problem of optimizing social welfare, another topic in fair division.
The "I cut, you choose" or divide-and-choose (DC) procedure is a well-known and ancient algorithm for dividing a resource among two parties [5] . The story of dividing a land between Abram and Lot in the Hebrew Bible refers to this method. In this procedure, the first party (Alice) cuts the cake into two parts and the second party (Bob) chooses one of the pieces, leaving the other piece for the first party. Note that Bob has an advantage over Alice for he can choose the best piece and can possibly get even more than half of the total value he assigns to the cake. In other words, when Alice does not know anything about Bob's valuation, she should divide the cake into two parts which are equal with respect to her valuation, so that despite Bob's choice, she gains at least half of the cake. However, Bob achieves more than half of the cake since he is free to choose. Since each party can obtain at least half the cake, this method is proportional but not equitable [9] .
The "Adjusted Winner" (AW) algorithm was originally proposed by Brams and Taylor [5] . Since then, it has been applied to disputes ranging from interpersonal to international [5] , [10] . Assume that two parties, say Alice and Bob, want to divide a set of m divisible goods. Alice's valuation vector is denoted by a vector a = (a 1 , . . . , a m ) of m non-negative real numbers that add up to one. Similarly, Bob's valuation vector is denoted by b = (b 1 , . . . , b m ). We assume that the value of a piece of cake for each player is the sum of the portion of each item present in that piece times the value that player assigns to that item. In the Adjusted Winner algorithm Alice and Bob announce their valuations vectors to an external referee. The referee solves a set of equations to come up with a division of the items which is proportional, equitable, envy-free and efficient. For extensions of AW to three players or more, see [5] , [11] , [12] .
Related to centralized algorithms in fair division is the problem of optimizing the social welfare by proper division of resources across a society. In the literature of economics, a social welfare is a function that collects the utilities of each individual in the society and returns a real value which reflects the overall welfare in the society. Philosophical utilitarianism suggests a division strategy that maximizes the overall happiness (or sum of the utilities of the individuals). Thus, the rules of division here are not decided by selfish players but by an external judge (or by players who follow Rawls's veil of ignorance [13] ). Another measure for social welfare that cares not only about the overall happiness but also about its uniform distribution over the individuals (an egalitarian philosophy) is the Nash collective utility function (CUF). Nash CUF is defined to be product of the utilities of the individuals [14] .
We refer the reader to [5] , [6] , and [15] for further reading on fair division.
B. Motivation: Utility Per Information Bit
To the best of our knowledge, the problem of fair division has only been analyzed when individuals do not know the valuation of others, or when they have complete information about the valuations; it is not analyzed in the case of partial information. To motivate this study, let us begin with the DC algorithm. As we saw previously, the second party, Bob, has advantage in choosing the piece he likes more. One way to make the algorithm more fair is to provide Alice with partial information about Bob's valuation. For instance if there is an item that Alice likes a lot but Bob is indifferent to it -and Alice knows this -she can put all of it in the piece that she predicts Bob will not choose. To quantize the role of information in such scenarios, we need to find the utility of individuals as a function of the rate of communication between them. This leads to characterizing an achievable rate-utility region. The tradeoff between the disadvantage of being the cutter and the advantage of having information is most notably present in a seller-consumer scenario. A seller offers a good for a price, and the consumer can choose to buy the item or keep his money. This problem resembles the DC algorithm and our formulation (defined later) is general enough to cover it. Setting a price by the seller resembles cutting a cake, and the consumer's choice of buying the item is like picking one of the two pieces "item" or "his money". As discussed above this transaction scheme is naturally biased towards the chooser, i.e. the consumer. But the seller has generally more information about the consumer's needs than the consumer has about the true price of the item. For instance, car manufacturing companies know well about consumer's preferences, whereas consumers who are unaware of the manufacturing process know little about the true price. The role of information in the bargaining dynamic is also colorful: the consumer hides how much he really needs the item while the seller hides how much the item is really worth.
C. Our Contributions
Given the diversity of problems in fair division, we consider certain specific (yet important) problems that capture different aspects of information exchange in a fair division setting. From the class of distributed algorithms, we consider the divide and choose problem between two parties. From the class of centralized algorithms, we consider the adjusted winner and the problem of optimizing the social welfare.
1) Divide and Choose:
In the literature of fair division, only one-shot of the divide and choose problem is considered. However, we consider both the one-shot and repeated divide and choose problems. In the repeated version, the divide and choose procedure is repeated n times on n identical cakes. Then, the average utility of each party is considered during n games. As was discussed before, parties are unaware of each other's valuations. However, they can achieve some amount of side information about the valuation of the other party which can help them achieve a better result. This flow of information and its impact on the result of the game is our main interest.
We take three rather different models for this problem in the subsequent sections. In our first model, we assume that Alice can spy on Bob prior to the division procedure. We call this the spying model. We consider both the one-shot and asymptotic cases. In the asymptotic case, we assume that parties' valuations are generated i.i.d. from a given probability distribution. The second model is a game theoretic and information theoretic one, where Bob chooses to communicate only when he expects the information to increase his utility in the divide and choose procedure. Thus, Bob can share information of his choice (at limited rate) to Alice prior to the division procedure. We call this the sharing model. In the third model, which is more game theoretic, we assume that instead of sharing or spying prior to the divide and choose procedure, information is flowed implicitly during the game. More precisely, rather than gaining explicit information before cutting the cake, parties receive information about each other's valuations through their actions. The main difference between this model and the previous ones is that the valuations are randomly generated from a given probability distribution once and for all, and are fixed during the n stage game. Therefore, unlike the first model where different stages of the game were independent, parties can gain information by looking at the history of the game. As a result, for instance Bob might have the tendency to hide his valuation by choosing the less valuable piece at one stage in order to deceive Alice and gain more during the next stages. We will explicitly identify a Trembling hand Nash equilibrium in the resulting repeated game. Trembling hand Nash equilibrium is one of the strictest forms of equilibria; for example, it implies the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. While repeated games are widely studied in game theory (e.g. see [16] ), explicit identification of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in repeated games with incomplete information on both sides is known to be very difficult in general. We show that Bob playing selfishly is an equilibrium and there is no incentive for him not to use his information initially, so that Alice does not learn about his valuation. Implicit communication through actions has also been studied in the information theory and control literature (e.g. see [17] , [18] ). But these works do not consider game equilibriums.
2) Adjusted Winner: Brams and Taylor showed that in the case of having two goods, i.e. m = 2, when one of the parties, say Alice, knows Bob's valuation while Bob is unaware of this, Alice can announce an untrue valuation in order to trick the procedure and gain more than what she otherwise would. We consider the same setup for the general m goods, but with the further refinement of assuming that Alice is only partially spying on Bob. It is shown that this problem reduces to the corresponding spying problem in the divide and choose problem. Next, if Alice is only allowed to spy binary questions of the form "Is Bob's valuation of a certain good less than a threshold?", we prove an upper bound on the growth rate of Alice's utility per the number of bits she has spied for the case of m = 2. This bound is shown to be tight for a range of parameters.
3) Maximizing Social Welfare: The last part of this paper provides a connection information theory and optimizing the social welfare under the Nash CUF in fair division in large societies, which is a clustering problem. This link provides an upper bound on the increase of the Nash CUF for a clustering refinement.
D. Notation and Organization of the Paper
All the logarithms are in base two throughout this paper. Also [a : b] for natural numbers a and b denotes the set {a, a + 1, a + 2, · · · , b}. We will also need the following definition:
Definition 1: For a pmf p X,Y , the information density ı p (x; y) is defined by
Markov chains are denoted by
This paper is organized as follows: in Section II, we study the divide and choose problem. In Section III, we consider the adjusted winner algorithm and finally in Section IV, we consider the Nash Collective Utility social welfare function. Proofs are given in the subsequent sections.
II. DIVIDE AND CHOOSE
We assume that the value each player gives to different pieces of the cake is a random variable on the set of possible values V which is assumed to be finite. We have no specific assumption over V, but for having an intuition, one can consider the following special case. Imagine the cake has m items: chocolate, cream, cherry,· · · . In this particular example, a valuation vector v is a vector of size m, (v 1 , . . . , v m ), whose indices are nonnegative real numbers adding up to one. The indices indicate interest in individual items. Thus if a certain piece of the cake has portion α i of item i , the value associated to this piece w.r.t. v is m i=1 α i v i . However it should be noted that in the general case, we do not assume that valuations are vectors. We also assume that D, the set of admissible divisions or admissible cuts, is finite. The utility of each player is a deterministic function of the valuations and the particular division d ∈ D. This is formalized in the following definition: 
Moreover, loosening the bounds given in equation (1) gives the following lower bound on Alice's utility
where γ is any positive number andḡ
The proof can be found in Section V-A. The above theorem should be understood as the one-shot version of Theorem 2, discussed in the next section. To intuitively understand (1), observe that q(u|v A , v B ) = q(u|v B ) and the auxiliary random variable U is representing the message that Alice has spied from Bob. From the perspective of Alice, the amount of information that U has about V B given that Alice already knows V A equals I (V B ; U |V A ) = I (U ; V B ) − I (U ; V A ). For the purpose of obtaining insights into (1), observe the term J −1 2 ı q (V B ;U ) and identify J with 2 ı q (V B ;U ) ; similarly, observe the JM −1 2 −ı q (V A ;U ) and identify M with
The spying is a number in the set [1 : M] , and hence we can identify the spying rate log M with ı q (V B ; U ) − ı q (V A ; U ) which is the one-shot analogue of
, the amount of information that U has for Alice.
Remark 1: The form of loosened bound makes it amenable to finite blocklength by setting γ of order log(n). Let us bound the equation (1) from below as follows:
The first term in the denominator, 1+J −1 2 ı q (V B ;U ) corresponds to a covering lemma in the asymptotic case, while the second term 1 + JM −1 2 −ı q (V A ;U ) corresponds to a packing lemma. Next, consider the special case of J = 1 in (1). Then, the bound becomes
where E * denotes expectation with respect to U DV A V B and E * * denotes expectation with respect to the distribution
. Note that this is precisely the utility that could be achieved without any communication and U being Alice's private randomness.
B. Spying: Asymptotic
Consider n repetitions of the game and consider the average utility over these games. Valuations of Alice and Bob over the n games are denoted by two sequences of length n, V n A for Alice and V n B for Bob. These two sequences are independently and identically generated from the joint distribution q(v A , v B ). Here, the i.i.d. assumption is made for mathematical convenience. Let R denotes the spying rate per game from Bob to Alice, i.e. it is equal to the total number of bits spied from Bob divided by n. The formal definition of an n-game code is in order. There are two relaxations in our formulation in this part compared to the traditional fair division setup. Firstly the number of games n is allowed to converge to infinity (it is not a one-shot result). Secondly we are not following the maximin rule (i.e. maximizing the minimum utility) with probability one. Instead we are relaxing this by requiring a guarantee with probability 1 − δ where δ converges to zero only after n converges to infinity.
We have Theorem 2: The set R is the closure of all rate utility tuples
for some (U, D) satisfying the Markov chain relations
and random variable D taking values on the set of all divisions D. This achievability part of this theorem follows the one-shot result given in Theorem 1. Alternatively, it follows from a result on empirical coordination. This proof is given in Section V-B. To intuitively understand the above theorem, as before U is representing the message that Alice has spied from Bob; the amount of information that U contains about V B for Alice is I (V B ; U |V A ). Thus, the inequality R > I (V B ; U |V A ) is saying that Alice needs a spying rate R of at least I (V B ; U |V A ) if she wants to learn U .
1) Spying Rate and Equitability:
In a practical scenario, it is quite reasonable to assume that Alice uses the information selfishly in order to maximize her utility. Therefore, we can define the selfish utility G sel A (R) to be the maximum utility Alice can obtain limiting the communication rate to a value R, i.e.
Bob always chooses the piece he likes more with no concern about Alice's utility. Let G sel B (R) denote the utility associated with Bob in this case. Since we want to study the equitability of the division (a fairness criterion discussed at the beginning of the introduction), we define the difference between these two utilities as 
However, other behaviors can be observed when changing V, D and the joint probability. Consider the following example.
Example 2: Let us keep V and D unchanged as in Example 1, but change the joint probability distribution as Figure 2a .
As mentioned before, Bob's utility will be always greater than or equal to Alice's for the choice of D = { , }.
Example 3: Let us consider the following setup: 
, as a function of the rate of communication R. Another interesting fact could be observed by changing the probability distribution of (10) into the following, and also adding to the set of admissible 
The rate utility region.
divisions, i.e.
As we can see in Figure 4a , Bob's utility first increases, then decreases and then increases again. The region of this setup is depicted in Figure 4b . This together with our latter observations suggest that Bob's utility does not have an specific behavior in general.
C. Information Sharing
Let us consider the following problem: assume that there is a one-way communication link of limited rate R from player B to player A. Unlike the previous problem, player B makes a decision as to whether to communicate any information to player A (instead of player A spying on player B by choosing the information that will be communicated by player B). More specifically, we consider a turn based game where Bob in the first turn reveals information of his choice to Alice. Next, Alice makes her move and cuts the cake. Player B can potentially benefit himself by communicating cleverly (yet honestly) to player A who will make the cut. The choice of communication protocol then serves the role of the strategy of Bob. This brings in a game aspect to the problem.
More specifically, we assume that Alice and Bob are playing the game on n repetitions of the divide and choose game. As in the previous section, we assume that the valuation vectors of Alice and Bob are i.
The two parties have also possibly access to a shared randomness S taking values in a finite set S. The amount of the shared randomness can be arbitrary, but fixed before the game starts. The strategy of Bob is q(c|v n B , s) where c is the message on the alphabet set [1 : 2 n R ] and S is a shared randomness between the two parties (independent of (V n A , V n B )). Alice's strategy is q(d n |v n A , c, s) where d i is the division by Alice in i -th game. Alice's payoff is the sum of the expected value of her payoff over the n games (after Bob picking his most favorable part in each game).
Observe that Bob may choose not to use the shared randomness by setting q(c|v n B , s) = q(c|v n B ). Also, when there is no communication between Alice and Bob, existence (or lack thereof) of shared randomness is not important in the set of utility pairs they can achieve.
Observe that the cut and choose game is not a zero-sum game, and hence there is no unique Nash equilibrium payoff. There may be many different optimal ways for Alice to cut the cake; different optimal ways of cutting the cake that are all the same from the perspective of Alice, but can affect Bob's average payoff. Fixing any of one these cutting strategies for Alice, she will not have any incentive for changing her strategy. Therefore, each of these strategies lead to an equilibrium. To state our main result, let us make the following definition, which considers the equilibriums in the one-shot instance of the problem with no communication: The following theorem characterizes a set of -equilibriums, wherein any change of strategy by Alice and Bob will not increase their payoff by more than .
by definition of optimality for Alice. This allows us to define a function G A (q(v
A , v B )) as Alice's utility for valuation distribution q(v A , v B ). Let G B,l (q(v A , v B )) = min (G A ,G B )∈G(q(v A ,v B )) G B G B,u (q(v A , v B )) = max (G A ,G B )∈G(q(v A ,v B )) G B Since G(q(v A , v B )
) is convex (as Alice can randomize between two optimal actions), we have (G
A (q(v A , v B )), G B ) ∈ G(q(v A , v B )) for any G B,l (q(v A , v B )) ≤ G B ≤ G B,u (q(v A , v B )).
Example 4: Let us compute the functions G A (q(v
A , v B )), G B,l (q(v A , v B )) and G B,u (q(v A , v B )) forq( , ) = q 00 , q( , ) = q 11 q( , ) = q 01 , q( , ) = q 10G A (q(v A , v B )) = (q 00 + q 01 ) max q 01 q 00 + q 01 , 1 2 + (q 10 + q 11 ) max q 10 q 10 + q 11 , 1 2 and G B,l (q(v A , v B )) = (q 00 + q 01 ) 1 2 + 1 2 1[q 01 > q 00 ] + (q 10 + q 11 ) 1 2 + 1 2 1[q 10 > q 11 ] G B,u (q(v A , v B )) = (q 00 + q 01 ) 1 2 + 1 2 1[q 01 ≥ q 00 ] + (q 10 + q 11 ) 1 2 + 1 2 1[q 10 ≥ q 11 ]Theorem 3: Let G * B (q(v A , v B )) be an arbitrary real-valued function defined on the set of all distributions q(v A , v B ) satisfying G B,l (q(v A , v B )) ≤ G * B (q(v A , v B )) ≤ G B,u (q(v A , v B )). Let G Bmax (q(v A , v B )) = max q(c|v B ):I (C;V B )≤R c q(c)G * B (q(v A , v B |c)), (12) where q(c, v A , v B ) = q(c|v B )q(v A , v B ).
Let q(c|v B ) be any arbitrary maximizer of G Bmax in (12).

Then, given any > 0, for sufficiently large n, one can find a shared randomness assisted strategy for players A and B with communication of rate R such that (i) the strategies form an -equilibrium, (ii) the corresponding payoff pair is coordinatewise within distance of
Proof of this theorem can be found in Section V-C. To intuitively understand the statement of the above theorem, we can think of C as the message that Bob sends to Alice, and q(c|v B ) as representing the action of Bob. The rate of the message of Bob, R, imposes the constraint I (C; V B ) ≤ R; we have a mutual information constraint because (12) is a singleletter form of the solution. Equation (12) reflects Bob choosing her strategy to maximize his utility. The corresponding utility of Alice is then given in (13) . We realize the single-letter bound within distance (thus we have an -Nash) when n is sufficiently large. We should emphasize that because of the -optimality requirement of an -Nash equilibrium, the proof is more intricate than the standard information theory proofs.
Example 5: Let us find a class of -Nash payoff rate pairs, given in (13) , for the setup of Example 4. The standard cardinality reduction techniques show that we may maximize over ternary random variables C in (12) .
We first find -Nash payoff rate pairs for the setup of Example 1 of the previous section where q 00 = q 11 = 2/6 and q 01 = q 10 = 1/6. We choose the function G * B to be 1/2G B,l + 1/2G B,u . For each rate 0 ≤ R ≤ 1, we pick one optimizer of (12) and compute the pair of (13) We also do the same for Example 2 of the previous section in Figure 6 , where q 00 = 1/14, q 01 = 6/14, q 10 = 5/14 and q 11 = 2/14. 
D. Implicit Information Transmission
In this part we assume that Alice's and Bob's valuations are generated from a given probability distribution q(v A , v B ) once and for all and will remain fixed during the subsequent n stage game. Alice's and Bob's valuations are chosen from V A and V B , respectively, which are the set of their permissible valuations.
As depicted in Fig. 7 , we assume that Alice has two possible actions at each step: she can either choose to play risky (denoted by R) or non-risky (denoted by NR). If she plays non-risky, then independent of Bob's valuation, both parties receive exactly half the cake, i.e. playing non-risky is equivalent to cutting the cake into two pieces worth exactly 1/2 with respect to any possible valuation of Alice and Bob. Therefore, the two pieces have exactly the same value for both players, and without loss of generality we do not consider any action for Bob. On the other hand, if Alice chooses the action R, then Bob can choose the left piece (action L) or the right piece (action R). If Bob plays L, then Alice receives a utility of G A and Bob receives G B where G A is a function of Alice's valuation and G B is a function of Bob's valuation. Since the whole cake has a utility of 1 for both parties, if Bob chooses R, then Alice and Bob receive 1 − G A and 1 − G B , respectively. We shall assume that
If two different valuations of v A , v B result in the same values for G A and G B , then in the sense of strategies and equilibriums these two valuations are identical. Therefore, in the following discussion we shall forget about valuations and instead assume that there is a joint distribution
where Alice knows G A and Bob knows G B . In fact, G A and G B are sufficient statistics. Therefore, the one stage game is of the form depicted in Figure 7 .
We assume that this one stage game is repeated n times during which Alice and Bob's valuations are chosen randomly at the beginning of the game and remain unchanged. Also, we assume that both players causally observe each other's actions and recall these actions as well as their own actions. Like the one stage game, Alice is only aware of her G A and Bob only knows G B . We denote Alice's and Bob's actions in n-stage game by a [1:n] and b [1:n] 
which is again a random variable. The utility of the whole game is E G X (A n , B n ) where the expected value is taken over all possible G A , G B and all possible actions resulting from strategies. Note that since n is fixed throughout the problem, we do not need to normalize the utility with n. ] will no longer be a random variable. In this case, we denote these utilities by
The main result of this section is to identify an equilibrium for the repeated form of the game.
It is worthwhile to mention the differences between this setup and that of Section II-D:
1) In the previous setup, valuations are generated independently in n stages while in this setup they are generated once and for all. 2) In the explicit setup, communication or spying is done prior to the divide and choose procedure, while in the implicit setup, information is transferred through actions. 3) In Section II-D we assume that Bob always chooses the piece which is more valuable for him, which was reasonable since stages were completely independent, while in the setup of this section, Bob is free to choose whichever part he wishes; however, as we will see, Bob is better off to choose the more valuable piece. 4) In this section we assume that there are only two permissible divisions for Alice, while in Section II-D, the set of permissible divisions, D is an arbitrary finite set. As we will see, it is more convenient to look at Bob's action from another point of view. We say that Bob plays selfish, or S, if he chooses the piece which has more value to him, and we say he plays NS is he chooses the cake with less value. More precisely,
and similarly
When the value of G A = g A is known, we use g max
A . Furthermore, define the random variable T as follows:
Intuitively, T = 0 means that Alice and Bob are interested in the same part of the cake, therefore only one of them can be happy at the same time. More precisely, it is easy to check that, if Alice plays R and Bob plays S, when T = 0 Alice receive G min It is evident that in this example, with probability 1 we have
Also, we have
We will denote Alice's and Bob's strategies by S A and S B , respectively. Note that strategies, which are assumed to be behavioral, are nothing but probability distributions assigning probabilities to each action at each node, based on one party's observations up to that time. Therefore, we use probabilistic notations for strategies; for instance, S A (a 3 |a 2 , b 2 , g A ) is the probability that Alice chooses action a 3 at stage 3 of the game when G A = g A and during stages 1 and 2, players had played action sequences
Identification of a strategy: One strategy for Bob is to always plays selfishly. We denote this strategy by S B .
One possible strategy for Alice in n-stage game, denoted by S A is as follows. Intuitively speaking, Alice guesses that Bob usually plays selfishly in order to maximize his own utility greedily. Based on this assumption, she counts the number of times she has risked so far and calculates the number of failures (with utilities less than half) and number of successes (with utilities more than half) among them. If the number of successes is more, she guesses that T = 1 and therefore continues to risk. However, if she has failed most of the times, she stops risking and guarantees herself a utility of 1/2 by playing NR. To be more specific, at stage k, Alice calculates (14) then she plays risky at stage k if n g (k) ≥ n l (k), and plays non-risky otherwise. Note that Alice always plays R at stage 1, since at this time n l (1) = n g (1) = 0. b) Conditions for being an equilibrium: Now assume that in a one stage game, making risk is advantageous for Alice for every value of g A . This means that her expected utility when playing R is greater than her expected utility when playing non-risky which is 1/2, i.e. for all g A we have
We want to show that the above strategy is an equilibrium in the n stage game. In repeated games (and more generally, in extensive games) instead of taking Nash Equilibrium as the solution, usually Sequential Equilibrium is considered [19] . We consider even a stronger equilibrium criteria named Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium (THP). In this equilibrium, it is assumed that at each stage, the hand of each player might "tremble" and he deviates from what he is supposed to do given his strategy. Then, a strategic game is defined from the extensive game by associating a different player for every player at each stage, we call each of these (pseudo players) an "agent". Then the strategy which is going to be proved to be THP is fixed for one agent and the trembled strategy is considered for other agents. This strategy should be a best response for all agents when trembling probability goes to zero. For more information about THP, see [19] . Now we are ready to state our main result 
Also we assume that G A = 1/2 with probability 1 and Note that since THP is stronger than Nash Equilibrium in games with perfect recall, it suffices to prove THP. The proof of this theorem is given in Section VI.
III. ADJUSTED WINNER
Assume two parties, say Alice and Bob, are about to divide a set of m goods. Unlike the Divide and Choose method, they announce their valuations over these goods which are nonnegative vectors of sum 1 and size m, a = (a 1 , . . . , a m ) for Alice and b = (b 1 , . . . , b m ) for Bob to a third party whose duty is to divide these items fairly based on these announced valuations. Adjusted Winner is an algorithm that solves a sequence of equations in order to give a division of the items which is equitable, envy free and efficient [5] . We note that the divide and choose method does not have these properties.
The adjusted winner algorithm divides the items as follows. Reorder the items so that,
Then give items 1 through t to Alice and items t +1 through m to Bob. If their utilities at this step is equal, the job is finished. First assume Alice's utility is more. In this case, give a portion of item t to Bob so that their utility becomes equal. If even by giving all of item t this did not happen, go for item t − 1 and continue this procedure until the equality holds. For the second case when Bob's utility is more, in a similar way, give a portion of item t + 1 to Alice to achieve equality. If this was not sufficient, go to item t + 2 and continue. Since eventually by giving all the items to the party with less utility, his utility becomes more, at some point in between their utilities become equal and the procedure terminates.
A. Spying in Adjusted Winner
A motivation for studying spying in the adjusted winner game is a result by Brams and Taylor who showed that in the case of having two items, a dishonest party who has full information about the other party's valuation vector, while the other party is unaware of this and acts honestly (i.e., the other party is spying), can trick the referee [5] . We are interested in quantifying the benefit partial spying, by assuming that Bob announces his valuation honestly while Alice uses the partial information he has gained by spying over Bob's valuation to trick the referee and announce an untrue valuation instead of her true valuation. = (a 1 , . . . , a m ) and b = (b 1 , . . . , b m ) are limited to be taking values in finite sets, and Alice can spy any arbitrary function of Bob's valuation vector consistent with her spying rate. The assumption that the set of valuations is finite is a practical assumption since we can assume that the value assigned to an item by each individual is a real number with finite precision. Therefore, the set of all valuation vectors is finite.
1) Reduction to
We can find the tradeoff between the "spying rate" and Alice's "spying utility" via a simple transformation from adjusted winner problem (AW) to the divide and choose (DC) problem as follows: Let Alice's announced valuation,ã, play the role of the division D in divide and choose and the following utility functions could be defined,
where · is the inner product operation. Note that although the two problems have conceptual differences, by using this transformation, we can consider this problem a special case of divide and choose. Also note that in this approach, the assumption of having two items, m = 2, is not necessary.
2) Restriction on the Structure of Spying:
The drawback of the above approach is that Alice is allowed to spy a complicated function of Bob's valuation vector. Let us restrict Alice to be able to only spy a set of simpler (but more realistic) questions of the form "Is Bob's valuation on the first item less than a particular value α or more than that?". We call these binary dividing questions. To study this problem, as in Brams and Taylor's work, we assume that the number of items, m, is equal to 2. Let * k (b min , b max ) denote the maximum increase in Alice's utility by asking the optimal k binary division questions.
,··· is a non-decreasing sequence of numbers because the more questions, the better Alice can perform. Since the valuation vectors add up to one, the maximum possible utility of Alice is one, and hence the increase in Alice's utility by k questions, * k (b min , b max ), is also bounded from above by one. We ask the following questions: Q1. Does the value of spying questions depreciate over time?
For instance, is it true that the extra utility we get by asking the third question is less than the utility we get by asking second question, i.e., * 
where we have used the concavity of the sequence. If the answer to Q2 is affirmative, then the average improvement on Alice's expected utility which is averaged over n games is bounded by R˜ since if Alice asks t i questions in the i th game, her maximum improvement is,
For Q1, we have the following result:
then the sequence *
is concave. Furthermore, the optimal cutting points {b 0 , Remark 2: The assumption 1/2 ≤ b min < b max ≤ 1 means that Alice knows which of the two items Bob likes more, but she does not know his exact valuation. Also note that the case which b min < b max < 1/2 (the entire interval falls in the left half) could be reduced to this case by changing the order of items.
For Q2, we have the following result: 
where
IV. MAXIMUM NASH COLLECTIVE UTILITY FUNCTION
In this section, we consider an arbitrary society with a government who wants to divide its several resources among the citizens. Each person assigns a value for each of the resources available to the government, and we assume that the government knows these valuations. The Nash collective utility function (Nash CUF) for a given division strategy is equal to the product of the utilities of individual members of the society of that division strategy. Maximizing the Nash CUF for this society implies a division policy for the government, specifying how much of each resource should be allocated to each individual. This is a natural resource allocation problem which has been also studied in the literature, e.g., see [20] , [21] .
For practical reasons the government may want to divide the citizens into several clusters, say drivers, teachers, etc., and apply the same division strategy uniformly to all people from the same class. Indeed, in order to maximize the Nash CUF, one could take the most refined partitions, where each partition consists of only one individual. However, this is usually very complicated to implement in real world. An example of a practical scenario where this issue is present is the progressive tax collection system. Although in tax collection, the goal is to collect utility from individuals rather than distributing it, one could adapt it to the above setup; e.g. by defining the payoff of an individual to be the inverse of the amount of the tax they pay. Indeed, governments do not allocate different tax profiles for each individual; instead, the society is divided into partitions called "tax brackets".
We consider the increase of Nash CUF for a clustering refinement and draw conceptual links between this problem and the portfolio selection problem in stock markets [22] .
A. The Model
Assume that the population of the society is n, which is fixed. The valuation vectors of all the individuals in the society is known to the government. We assume that the government has partitioned the society into k clusters P = (P 1 , . . . , P k ). Let n i denote the number of people in cluster P i and α i = n i n . The government has decided to use a fixed division strategy for all people in cluster i which is denoted by b i . The sum of the portion each individual receives should sum up to one, i.e. Based on the valuation vectors of individuals, the government wants to divide the items so as to maximize the Nash CUF of the society, which is
In the second scenario, the government divides one of the classes, say the first class, into two subclasses 1a and 1b and uses different division protocols for these subclasses. If P denotes the new partitioning and W P to be the maximum Nash CUF in the new scenario,
By taking b 1a = b 1b = b 1 and b i = b i for i > 1, we realize that W P ≥ W P . In fact by refining the classification, the government can improve the social welfare, which was expected. In this section, we are interested in finding an upper bound on the possible improvement after this refinement.
Define V i to be the random variable whose distribution is the empirical distribution of the valuation vector of people in class i , i.e. for any set A
also define r.v.'s V 1a and V 1b to be the random variables for empirical distribution of subclasses 1a and 1b. Values of α 1a and α 1b are defined in a natural way by dividing the size of classes 1a and 1b to n. Note that
We can define a random variable E indicating where a randomly chosen person from class 1 belongs to 1a, or to 1b. In this case p(E = 0) = α 1a /α 1 and
, which is simply the Bayes rule. We denote the support of V 1 by the set V 1 (i.e.
. Similarly we let V 1a and V 1b to be the support of V 1a and V 1b . Note that V 1a ⊂ V 1 and V 1b ⊂ V 1 . In a more generalized but similar case, we can assume that instead of dividing cluster P 1 into 2 clusters, we divide it into t clusters P 1,1 , . . . , P 1,t and show the new partitioning by P . Exactly in the same way, we define random variables E and V 1 .
Remark 3: If we define the distance between two nonnegative vectors v and w by − log(v · w), we can reexpress the problem of finding an optimal k-clustering as an unsupervised clustering of the valuation vectors of the whole society into k clusters. Vectors b i will be the centers which need to satisfy k i=1 n i b i = 1. Note that − log(v · w) is not a metric. Our result is the following: Theorem 7: With the above notations, if we refine the clustering P by dividing cluster P 1 into t clusters resulting in a new clustering P , we have,
Remark 4: Since P is a refined version of P, the lower bound on W P is expected. To intuitively understand the upper bound, note that a good clustering of P 1 puts valuation vectors that are geometrically close to each other into the same cluster. Therefore knowing that a person is in a certain cluster P 1,E for some E should provide some information about the geometrical location of the valuation vector of the person. Thus I (V 1 ; E) is large for a good clustering. However a large I (V 1 ; E) does not necessarily imply a good clustering. Such information theoretic interpretation of clustering (traditionally a topic of data mining and machine learning) may be new (we have not seen it) and it may be of independent interest.
Remark 5: The distribution of p(v 1 ) is the empirical distribution of valuation vectors in P 1 and p(v 1 |E = e) is the empirical distribution of valuation vectors in P 1,e . I (V 1 ; E) is computable from these empirical distributions.
Proof of Theorem 7: As we have already discussed, W P ≥ W P , and it remains to prove the other side. For simplicity, we assume that t = 2; the case of t > 2 is similar. Note that maximizing W P is equal to maximizing 1 n log W P = max
Similarly,
The above equations show that Nash Collective Utility is equivalent to the mathematics of portfolio selection problem in stock markets (see [22] ), if we interpret division into groups as the equivalent to side information. With this in mind, the benefit of adding extra groups equivalent to adding additional side information. If we show the original divisions into groups (previous side information) by rv E , the new division into groups will be corresponding to random variables (Ẽ, E ) where we assume thatẼ is a constant when E = 1, and E = E when E = 1. Thus, from the increase in the exponent of the growth [22] , we get
V. PROOFS FOR EXPLICIT DIVIDE AND CHOOSE
A. Proof for One-Shot Spying
Proof of Theorem 1:
We employ the technique of [23] to provide a lower bound on the expected utility of Alice after spying about Bob's valuation. Let C = {U ( j )} J j =1 be a random product codebook, in which are drawn independently from q U . We utilize the likelihood encoding construction of [23] . We draw an index j ∈ [1 : J] with the probability
.
where we have use capital P since the above conditional pmf is itself random (due to the random codebook generation). Then, we transmits m = B( j ) to Alice as the spying content. Alice uses m to drawĵ from the following pmf
1[·] is the indicator function. Finally, Alice produces D from q D|U V A (d|U (ĵ), v A ).
Observe that the joint distribution of random variables factors as,
We now compute the expected value of Alice's utility over the random codebook and random binning. This is done in the chain of equations at the top of the next page, where equation (28) is due to the symmetry of the random codebook generation; equation (29) follows from Jensen's inequality for the jointly convex function f (x 1 , x 2 ) = 1/(x 1 x 2 ); equation (30) follows from the fact that for anyj = 1
Similarly for anyj = 1
Equation (31) follows from the fact that E U (1) is over q(u) and
The derivation of Bob's utility is similar. Note that the spying strategy of Alice is randomized here. Based on a private randomness (the random codebook and random binning), she decides her spying function.
Deriving the loosened bound is as follows:
B. Proof of Theorem 2
For achievability, we use the existing results on the empirical coordination, which is summarized as follows. Assume two terminals have i.i.d. samples of random variables X 1 and X 2 with joint pmf p(
The goal is to simulate the channel p(y 1 , y 2 |x 1 , x 2 ) and generate Y 1 and Y 2 in terminals 1 and 2 respectively. Since the first terminal has only access to X 1 while Y 1 is dependent on both X 1 and X 2 , which is the same story for the second terminal, the two terminals need to communicate with some rate in order to gain information about the other terminal so that they can simulate the channel. This process could involve multiple rounds of communication in general. The two terminals need to generate jointly typical sequences of Y n 1 and Y n 2 with X n 1 , X n 2 with high probability. Substituting X 1 by V A , X 2 by V B , Y 1 by D and Y 2 by a constant, say 0, one can observe from the result of [24] that empirical coordination holds if R > I (V B ; U |V A ). Using properties of typical sequences,
since utilities are bounded by 1. The same inequality holds for G B . This proves the achievability.
The converse has much in common with the proof of the converse in [24] by setting X 1 = V A , X 2 = V B , D = Y 1 and Y 2 = 0 in their terminology. Assuming an (n, R) code with communication variable C and division D n , we define the auxiliary random variables U and D as follows: take Q to be a random variable independent from all other random variables and uniformly distributed in [1 : n] and
note that since Q is uniform and independent from all other random variables and [24] and thus omitted from here. Finally, note that
Following a similar procedure |G B − G B | < δ.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof of Theorem 3: Let us fix some alphabet set S and pmf p(s) for the shared randomness. Then, the strategy of Bob is q(c|v |c, s) . Alice plays her best response in the i -th game, and a rate pair from G(q(v Ai , v Bi |c, s)) will occur. We assume that Alice's choice of her best response is such that
where the expression is computed with respect to
, s) will lead to an equilibrium; Alice is always playing one of her best responses and Bob has maximized his payoff by choosing r (c|v n B , s). The utility of Alice will then become
It remains to show that the payoffs given in equations (35) and (36) can be related to the ones given in the statement of the theorem in equation (13) . We argue that the following two claims establish our desired result: Claim 1 is that for any n, any p(s), and any r (c|v n B , s) for |C| ≤ 2 n R , we have that 1
Therefore, the payoff of Bob in the Nash equilibriums that we have defined in equation (35) 
and the utility of the player A,
The above two claims prove our result. The reason is that by Claim 1, Bob can never expect to have a payoff larger than G Bmax . Then if we choose some q(c|v B ) where
is within /2 of G Bmax , Claim 2 shows that the resulting strategy of Bob will be within of G Bmax . Therefore, it has to be an -equilibrium from the perspective of Bob. Since Alice is always performing her best response cut (as we consider G A (q(v Ai , v Bi |c, s))), she does not have any incentive to change her actions. Therefore, the payoffs given in equations (35) and (36) can be made within distance of the rate pair given in equation (13) .
Proof of Claim 1: Let Q be a time-sharing variable, uniform on [1 : n] and independent of previously defined variables.
Furthermore, the joint pmf of
where (40) follows from the independence of shared randomness S n from V n B .
Proof of Claim 2:
The problem is that the alphabet set ofC n can be much larger than 2 n R = 2 n(I (V B ;C)+ ) . In the rest of the proof, we show one essentially communicateC n while only sending a message of around 2 n(I (V B ;C)+ ) . This message will be a bin index of C n . Following the approach of [25] , the remaining uncertainty ofC n will be treated as "shared randomness". the details are given below. Binning: Let us denote the alphabet set ofC byC. Then, C n takes values inC n . We consider two binnings of the set C n at rates H (C|V B ) − 2 and I (V B ;C) + . We can show two such binnings by functions
Since we want to use the concept of random binning, we will think of F 1 and F 2 as randomly chosen functions. The two random binnings are assumed to be done independently. Let B 1 and B 2 be the random bin indices ofC n respectively, i.e., B 1 = F 1 (C n ) and
Since the sum of the binning rates exceeds H (C), by the Slepain-Wolf theorem, there is a decoding function q SW the bin indices (B 1 , B 2 ) such that for any > 0 and for large n
Further by the OSRB lemma [25, Th. 1], B 2 is on average almost independent of V n B :
By summing up (43) and (44), we find that
Since average of the above expression over all random binnings is small, then there must exists a pair of deterministic binnings such that 
Then, from equations (45) and the fact that q SW (c n |b 1 , b 2 ) is a deterministic mapping, we get
Code Construction: Remember that our aim at the beginning of the proof was to essentially communicateC n while reducing the cardinality of the message to around 2 n(I (V B ;C)+ ) . We would like to treat B 2 as shared randomness; this requires B 2 to be completely independent of (V n A , V n B ). Note that from (47), B 2 is almost independent of (V A ,C n which is different from the ones given above, but is shown to be close in total variation distance with their distribution given above. Consider the scenario where we start with B 2 as a shared randomness between the two players. We take the shared randomness B 2 is independent of (V (c n |b 1 , b 2 ) . The joint pmf induced by the alternative scenario will be
, which is in 4 total variation distance of the original i.i.d. pmf by equation (48). With probability 1 − 4 , the two scenarios are not statistically distinguishable. Hence,
whereḡ B is a universal upper bound on G * B ( p(·, ·)) for all pmfs p(·, ·). Using equation (42), we obtain
whereḡ A is a universal upper bound on G A ( p(·, ·)) for all pmfs p(·, ·). Thus, we have constructed our desirable code.
VI. PROOF OF TREMBLING HAND PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM (THP)
Let S = (S A , S B ) denote the strategy given in Section II-D.1. In order to show that this pair of strategy is THP, we should introduce a sequence of completely mixed strategies converging to S where S should be the best response at all information sets for every element of the sequence. Define completely mixed strategy pair S = (S A , S B ) as follows. At any given information set, the player who should continue the game chooses the action given by S with probability 1 − and the other possible action with probability . Then with → 0, S converges to S. We will show that for small enough, S is the best response at any information set given S for other information sets, yielding the desired sequence of completely mixed strategies.
For doing so, for any given information set θ , we fix strategy S for information setsθ = θ and find the optimal action at θ . This action turns out to be the action given by strategy S. θ can be an information set of Alice or Bob. In the following, we first analyze Alice's information sets and then we will go through Bob's information sets in Section VI-B.
A. Alice's Information Sets
is a given information set for Alice. Assume n g (k) and n l (k) are the number of gains and losses of Alice in this information set as was defined in (14) which could be computed by having θ . We shall fix strategy S for all other information sets and find the optimal strategy in θ . Such a strategy would be relevant only if we pass through θ . Upon reaching θ , Alice's strategy would be a combination of playing R and NR. However, since the resulting maximization is linear and hence could be restricted to pure strategies in this information set, it suffices to show that the action given by strategy S in θ is optimal. Also, note that since θ is given, Alice's gains at stages 1 through k − 1 could be deterministically calculated. Therefore, we only need to consider gains at stages k through n and show that playing according to the strategy in θ is optimal. In other words, we want to show that for sufficiently small , the maximum
and n l (k) are the gains and losses of Alice which can be computed from
Observe that in f NR ( ), since A k = NR, Bob has no choice in that stage of the game and the value of B k is irrelevant. We need to compare f NR ( ) and f R ( ) for sufficiently small.
Observe that
A similar expression could be written for f NR ( ). In order to make the comparison, we need the following lemma:
and finally, if n g (k) = n l (k) then for all values of we have
We provide the proof of this lemma later but observe that this lemma has an intuitive interpretation: when n g (k) > n l (k), it is more probable that T = 1 since T = 0 results in more losses to Alice; therefore, it suffices for Alice to assume T = 1 and perform her strategy accordingly, which is R in this case. On the other hand, when n g (k) < n l (k), Alice is better off assuming T = 0 and play NR. When n g (k) = n l (k), the posteriors p(T = 0|g A ) and p(T = 1|g A ) is Alice's belief on T .
This lemma implies that to compare f R ( ) with f NR ( ) for small , when n g (k) > n l (k) we need to comparê
for two values of X = R and X = NR. Similarly, when n g < n l we need to comparê
and when n g = n l we should comparê
In the sequel, we do the comparisons for these three cases separately.
In this case, we show thatf R (0) > f NR (0) which implies that for small values of , we havê f R ( ) >f NR ( ). To do so, note that setting = 0 is equivalent to setting A [k+1:n] and B [k+1:n] to the path given by strategy S.
In order to computef R (0), note that such a path could be obtained by noting that when T = 0, Alice plays R in stage k which results to a loss (since Bob plays S and T = 0) and from then on, Alice plays NR resulting in an overall utility of g min A + (n − k)/2. On the other hand, when T = 1, Alice will always gain and n g will always remain greater than n l , yielding an overall utility of (n − k + 1)g max A . Therefore,
f NR (0) could be computed similarly. Note that when T = 0, since we have assumed that Alice plays NR in stage k, he gains 1/2 in that stage, leaving n g = n l . If k < n, Alice risks in stage k + 1 and will play NR in the remaining stages. This will give her a total utility of
On the other hand, when T = 1, Alice gains 1/2 in stage k and then will risk at the remaining stage and will gain g max A yielding an overall utility of
In order to compare these two values, note that
where (a) exploits the fact that g min A ≤ 1/2 and (b) uses our main assumption (15) . Since this is strictly greater than zero, we are done in this case.
2) n g (k) > n l (k): As was discussed before, we should only consider the terms corresponding to T = 1. Quite similar to the discussion of the last section, we havê
Thereforê
Considering terms corresponding to T = 0 we havef
Proof of Lemma 1: First assume n g (k) < n l (k). Using Bayes rule, we have
Now for t ∈ {0, 1} we have
Note that the term p (a i |g A , T = t, a i−1 , b i−1 ) corresponding to Alice's strategy is independent from the value of t, since Alice only looks at g A and determines the number of gains and losses from the sequence of actions to determine her action. Therefore
We know that when Alice plays R, Bob always plays S with probability 1 − and NS with probability . As a result, in case T = 0, we can conclude that when Alice loses, Bob has played S. The number of such stages is n l , contributing a term (1 − ) n l (k) to the probability. Furthermore, when Alice gains, Bob has played NS which contributes a term n g (k) . The case T = 1 is similar. Therefore
Putting this into (53) and sending → 0 we get the desired result. The two other cases are similar.
B. Bob's Information Sets
of Bob is given. If a k = NR, then Bob has no choice, therefore assume that a k = R. We shall fix strategy S for all other information sets and find the optimal strategy in θ . Such a strategy would be relevant only if we pass through θ . Upon reaching θ , Bob's strategy would be a combination of playing S and NS. However, following the same discussion we had for Alice, since the resulting maximization is linear and hence could be restricted to pure strategies in this information set, it suffices to show that the action given by strategy S in θ is optimal. Also, note that since θ is given, Bob's gains at stages 1 through k −1 could be deterministically calculated. Therefore, as before we only need to consider gains at stages k through n and show that playing selfishly is optimal. In other words, we should solve the following optimization problem
for small values of , where A k = a k (since we have conditioned on θ ) and the future actions A [k+1:n] , B [k+1:n] follow then one given by S (i.e. S with probability 1 − and the other possible action with probability ). We need to show that the answer to the above maximization problem is b k = S. In fact, we should compare the following two functions for small values of . For X ∈ {S, NS}, with G B (X) being a shorthand for
Note that we can expand Hence, it suffices to show that both conditioned on T = 0 and T = 1, S is dominant. In other words, if we define
we will show that for any value of T = t ∈ {0, 1} we have f S,t ( ) ≥ f NS,t ( ) for sufficiently small. 1) Case T = 1: Showing That f S,1 ( ) ≥ f NS,1 ( ) for Small : Since T and g B are fixed, similar to Section VI-A we can define n g and n l with respect to Alice at each stage. It is more convenient to look at terms in (56) as a one dimensional random walk in the following way. Note that at stage j , if we define δ( j ) = n g ( j )−n l ( j ) to be the difference between gains and losses of Alice before stage j , action pair a j , b j will either add one unit to this value after playing at stage j , subtract one unit or leave it unchanged. More precisely, if δ ≥ 0, there are three possible moves: (i ) a j = R, b j = S which increases δ by one (since T = 1) which is equivalent to one move to the right in the random walk with probability (1 − ) 2 , this action has a utility of G max B for Bob, (ii) a j = R, b j = NS which is equivalent to a left move with probability (1 − ) and gain G min B and (iii) a j = NR which is equivalent to no move with probability 1 − and gain 1/2. Similarly, one can define transition probabilities and gains for δ < 0 which is depicted in Figure 8 .
From now on, we shall continue our argument solely on this random walk. Define F 1 δ,l ( ) to be the expected value of sum of the gains one would observe if he started at position δ and moved l times, which is a polynomial in . Note that
Now we claim that for all values of , we have f R,1 ( ) ≥ f NR,1 ( ), showing that playing R at this information set is dominant. In order to show this, we use the idea of coupling in this random walk. When we choose to play S at stage k, we move man number 1, say the selfish man, from position δ(k) to δ(k) + 1 and from then on, he moves randomly n − k times. On the other hand, when we decide to play NS, we move man number 2, say the non-selfish man, from position δ(k) to δ(k) − 1 and let him move n − k times. Assume S ( j ) for j > 0 be the position of the selfish man at stage k + j − 1; hence, S (1) = δ(k) + 1 and S ( j ) for j > 0 is a random variable. Define NS ( j ) similarly for the non-selfish man. Also, S ( j ) is independent from NS (k) since their moves are independent.
For each of the two men, X ∈ {S, NS}, define
1, for each of the two men, utility at stage j is equal to
Therefore, the overall gain in stages k through n for X ∈ {S, NS} would be
and for X ∈ {S, NS},
This suggests that the overall utility is only a function of the moves through the overall displacement at stage n (i.e. the final location of the two men at the final stage). This is a result of the fact that the average of gains of moving right and left in the random walk is equal to the gain of no move. Now define˜ X ( j ) (X ∈ {S, NS}) to be the coupled placement of the two men as follows: The two men move independently until the first time they reach the same node. From that point on, the two men are coupled and forced to move together on the Markov chain (i.e. one of the men walks randomly on the chain with the other man mimicking his moves). It is evident that the marginal distribution of˜ X ( j ) is equal to the distribution of X ( j ), since the two men are moving on the same random walk. Since the non-selfish man starts to the left of the selfish man, i.e.˜ NS (1) = δ(k) − 1 < δ(k) + 1 =˜ S (1), and they get coupled when they reach at the same node, the non-selfish man cannot go to the right of the selfish man. In other words, with probability one we havẽ Therefore,
where (a) exploits equation (57) and the fact that g max B ≥ 1/2. This completes the proof for this case.
2) Case T = 0: Showing That f S,0 ( ) > f NS,0 ( ) for Small : Similar to the previous case, we can define a similar yet different random walk which is depicted in Figure 9 . F 0 δ,l ( ) is defined similarly. Quite similar to the previous case, consider selfish and non-selfish men and denote their placement by S ( j ) and NS ( j ) for j > 0 and
It is easily verified that all expressions are similar to those of case T = 1 by substituting g max B with g min B ; hence, for X ∈ {S, NS},
Again, define˜ X ( j ) to be the coupled random variable representing coupled placement of the two men. Sincẽ
Using this and the fact that the marginal distribution of˜ X is equal to the distribution of X , we have (ã, a b) which is equal to,
his announced valuation is denoted by
where · is the inner product operation.
Using (59) we can write the exact expression of this function as we will see later. An example of is presented in Figure 10 .
In the case where b is uniformly distributed in [b min , b max ], the utility associated withã is an integral with respect to b, which is discussed in the following definition. Note thatã and b are the two inputs to the Adjusted Winner algorithm. When we integrate over b, at one point in the integration b =ã. As is discussed in Section VII-A in the case where the two inputs to the Adjusted Winner algorithm are identical, there are two possible divisions of the cake as the output of the algorithm. If both players had announced their valuations truly, these two divisions would give them the same utility; however, in our scenario, Alice announces an untrue valuation. Thus, whenã = b, these two valuations result in two different utilities for Alice and the function under integration is not defined in this one point. However, since the integral is not dependent on the value of one point, we can omit it. 
The maximum improvement by asking k questions is *
Note that the term
in (63) For the sake of simplicity we have assumed the maximums in Definitions 9 and 10 exist. One can check that if we replace maximums by supremum and taking suboptimal points, the same results hold.
Note that * is defined on intervals. When we want to prove upper bounds on utility improvement, it will be convenient to work with a special set of these functions, which we name interval concave. Note that this terminology is not related to the concept of concavity and is used simply because the condition has similarities to what we have for concave functions. 
The proof of the above theorem is given in Section VII-D. The proofs of the other main theorems are given in appendices VII-C and VII-E.
A. Deriving Adjusted Winner formulation for Two Goods
When there are only two goods, by changing their ordering, we realize that AW (a, b), which is vector of size 2, is the reverse of AW (1 − a, 1 − b) . Therefore, it suffices to analyze the case when b ≤ 1/2. We will take three cases:
Case I, 0 ≤ a ≤ b: Since the valuation of Bob is more than Alice in the first good and the valuation of Alice is more in the second good, the initial allocation is
where Alice's utility is 1 − a and Bob's is b. Since Alice's utility is more, a portion of the second good should be given to Bob. Solving the equations, the final allocation would be,
It should be noted that in the case of a = b, there is no unique allocation, since in that case the initial allocation is giving all the goods to Alice, but we can start with either the first good to give to Bob or the second one. Therefore, any of the following allocations is feasible, , which give us exactly the same utility. We note that we would get the second allocation instead of the first if we took the case of a = b in Case II (discussed below). Therefore, the AW function is not well defined when the valuations are identical. where Alice's utility is a which is greater than that of Bob which is 1 − b. Thereby, a portion of the first good should be given to Bob. Solving for equality, the final allocation would be
When b > 1/2, by considering AW (1 − a, 1 − b) and reversing the answer, we can find the allocation in general:
Taking the similar terms together and neglecting the cases when a = b which is not well defined as discussed before, we get the following simplified formulation:
Note that as discussed before, the special case when a = b does not result in a unique division, and we have taken one of the possible cases. However, as we will see later, the case of a = b is not interesting for us, therefore this conflict is acceptable for the purpose of our study. An interesting fact is that, the four above cases are not independent. In fact the two following equalities (which are true, even when m > 2) relate these four cases:
where the reverse operator acts as (α, β) r = (β, α). Note that these are simply the case where the ordering of players or the placement of items are altered.
B. Some Lemmas
First, we start by the following observation regarding the * function. The optimal value ofã when Alice knows Bob's valuation has been analyzed formerly, a discussion could be found in [5] . 
In fact, this shows that if a > b, the optimal value ofã is b + = b + , and when a < b, the optimal value isã = b − = b − . In fact in these two cases does not have a maximum. It should be noted that the AW function is not well defined whenã = b and a = b.
Proof: First, we give the exact formulation of using (59) and Definition 7,
which is increasing inã ≤ b, decreasing in b <ã < 1 − b and 1 − b ≤ã, also the limit of the second case whenã goes to 1 − b from left is equal to a which is equal to the value of the third case forã = 1 − b. Therefore, the function is continuous everywhere expect possibly in b. The left and right limits at b are (1 − a)/(2 − 2b) and (1 + a − 2b)/(2 − 2b) respectively. We see that the left limit is greater when a < b, they are equal when a = b and the right limit is greater when b < a, which shows (71) in this special case. The concave/convex statements are evident from the expression. Now assume b > 1/2, we have,
which is increasing in 0 ≤ã ≤ 1 − b and 1 − b <ã < b and decreasing in b <ã. The limit of the second case and the value of the first case are both equal to 1 − a atã = 1 − b. Thereby, the function is equal at that point. The left and right limits at b are 1 − a/2b and a/2b respectively, therefore left limit is greater when b > a, the right limit is greater when b < a and they are equal when a = b, which again verifies (71). Again, the concave/convex statement are evident from the expression.
Using this Proposition, we can conclude the following statement which justifies Definition 9.
Corollary 1: The optimum value forã for
hence the maximum cannot happen at thisã. The proof for the case whereã > b max is similar using the fact that
We expect that by asking a number of questions, the expected utility for Alice increases, and the more questions she asks, the more is this improvement. The following proposition states this. (76)
C. Proof of Theorem 5
First, we prove some tools. In this special case when 1/2 ≥ b min , the integral in (61) could be computed and the following properties could be easily derived by taking the first and second derivatives. 
Omitting the linear terms, we need to show that log .
Since the denominator is positive, the first derivative is less than or equal to zero if and only if a ≤ τ l . The following Lemma gives a simple expression for * in this special case. 
(86)
Proof: As we have shown before, (ã, a b min , b max ) is differentiable and concave inã, therefore its maximum value either happens at endpoints or could be obtained by setting its derivative equal to zero. However, since the function is concave, the maximum happens at b max if and only if the derivative is nonnegative entirely in the interval, which reduces to the condition that the derivative is nonnegative at b max . Simplifying this condition, we realize that this happens when a ≥ τ u , therefore substitutingã = b max we get the expression for the first case. Using a similar method and by setting the derivative at b min to be less than or equal to zero, we get the second case.
In the next Lemma, we derive the exact form of 
Proof: We will take two cases, a ≥ τ u or a ≤ τ l . First assume that a ≥ τ u . Using Lemma 4 we have, 
Since log is increasing, in order to maximize this, we need to minimize α where,
If we defineŝ i =b i /b i−1 , sinceb i is a geometric sequence,
Now define ρ i = log s i andρ i = logŝ i . Note thatρ i is a constant sequence. In fact, since s i = ŝ i = b max /b min , ρ i = ρ i = log b max − log b min . Alsob i is geometric, hence for all 1 ≤ j ≤ 2 k
Now, by defining f (x) = log(1 + e −x ) which is convex,
where ( 
where again we have used Lemma 3 which guarantees that a ≤ τ l (b i−1 , b i ). Omitting the constant terms, we should maximize
Since log is increasing, we should minimize β = 
where (a) uses Jensen's inequality and convexity of g, (b) uses (92) and (c) uses the fact thatρ i is a constant sequence. Thusb i minimizes β or equivalently maximizes k . Remark 6: Note that this lemma shows that the optimal series of divisions for k questions is exactly the same for that of k − 1 questions together with the optimal dividing question for each of the 2 k−1 subintervals. Similarly, for the case of a ≥ τ u :
a log 
is increasing in s when 1 ≤ s ≤ √ 2 (s is the square root of the ratio of b max and b min and hence is greater than 1, also b max /b max is at most 2, since b min ≥ 1/2 and b max ≤ 1). Monotonicity of f could be shown analytically. Its plot is provided in Figure 11 . Now we have sufficient tools to prove Theorem 5.
Proof of Theorem 5:
For the sake of simplicity, we use * k to denote * k (b min , b max ). For proving the concavity of the sequence, it suffices to prove that for k ≥ 2, *
where * 0 is defined to be 0. Assume b 0 , . . . , b 2 k is the sequence given by Lemma 5 which maximize k . Note that since the sequence is geometric, the sequence b i , 0 ≤ i ≤ 2 k , i ≡ 0 (mod 2) is the sequence maximizing k−1 and also the sequence b i , 0 ≤ i ≤ 2 k , i ≡ 0 (mod 4) maximizes k−2 . Hence,
